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Convocational Democracies, Political stability, and External Intervention

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Abstract

Existing studies argue that consociational democratic systems and power sharing are the typical methods for ending confrontation and building political institutions that can bring stability and security in deeply divided societies. This argument needs to be reexamined because there are many cases where consociational democratic systems and power sharing fail to bring security and stability to these societies for a long period of time. This study claims that consociational democratic systems motivate the intervention of neighboring states in deeply divided societies that have not yet fully converted to democratic systems and when ethnic minorities are divided between different states in the region. This study also claims that the likelihood of instability increases in new consociational democratic systems with deeply divided societies. This study will track the effect of consociational democracies on political stability, and external intervention in deeply divided societies.

Introduction

The question of how political systems can bring both stability and democracy in divided societies has been a puzzle for scholars in conflict management since the 1950's and 60's. Arend Lijphart argues that the consociational democratic system is not only appropriate in fragmented societies, but also, for many states, it is an important method to move forward toward democratic stability. Sometimes, according to Lijphart, the choice is between consociational democracy, which may lead to a democratic system down the road, or authoritarianism (Lijphart 1969). The consociational theory of managing conflict in divided nations is one of the most influential, which addresses institutional design as a means to bring about peace and stability. Lijphart claims that the theory is based on Dutch politics, and argues that consociational democracies share four features: "grand coalition government between parties from different segments of society...segment autonomy in the cultural sector...proportionality in the voting system and in public sector employment... [and] minority veto." The main elements of this theory derive from the fact that racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, ideological, and cultural segmentation create fragmentations within societies (Wolff 2010). The question derived from

these arguments is: To what extent do new consociational democratic systems have a negative effect on stability in countries that are deeply divided when ethnic minorities are divided between different states in the region? Also, to what extent do new consociational democratic systems encourage neighboring states intervention in deeply divided societies when ethnic minorities are divided between different states in the region? Power sharing and consociational thinking are becoming popular methods of conflict management and building political institutions within deeply divided societies after civil wars. The debate about its effectiveness is divided between optimists and pessimists. The pessimists argue that consociational democratic systems cannot bring about stability, and rather, lead to unstable situations within nations for a long period of time. It is worth noting that there are some cases in the world where consociational democracies have succeeded, such as Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium. On the other hand, there are also cases where consociational democratic systems have not succeeded, such as Lebanon, Cyprus, Fiji, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Malaysia (Wolff 2010). Elissi (2004, 9) addresses the weaknesses of consociational democracy: Power-sharing is not sufficiently democratic; it cannot work in practice; a key explanation for its failure is that it does not contain incentives for moderate behavior; that regional autonomy in particular, leads to secession and partition; that autonomy increases conflict between the ethnic groups since it strengthens, rather than weakens, the cohesion and distinctiveness of them. The last objection is; that the elements of the consociational model are based on European or western experiences and thus it does not suit the more divided multi-ethnic societies in other parts of the world. A few examples demonstrate the unique nature of consociational democracies in divided societies. After adopting a consociational democracy in 2003, Iraq experienced a sectarian system, with the new constitution design based on a sectarian formula. The constitution allocated the presidency to the Kurds minority, the speakership to the Sunni minority, and the premiership to the Shia minority. The constitution's design created an unstable situation in Iraq, and it enhanced the sectarian formula system (Younis 2011, 5-6). This situation hinders the democratic development in Iraq and divides Iraqis deeply, increasing the levels of instability, tension, and confrontation between different groups and sects. In addition, a consociational democratic system encourages regional states to intervene in internal Iraqi affairs. Since 2003, Iraq has not been able to control most of its territory, provide service to its people, and function as a normal state. Furthermore, according to the Polity IV dataset, Iraq has remained at a low

score of democracy, despite its adoption of a consociational democratic system since 2003. Younis (2011, 5-6) discusses the negative effects of the Iraqi consociational democratic system, stating that:

The result is that an extraordinary level of executive power is concentrated in the office of the prime minister ... This has had two serious effects on Iraqi politics. Firstly, it renders the office of prime minister vulnerable to abuse with potentially devastating effects. The only Iraqi prime minister to be elected under this Constitution to date used the position to amass tremendous personal power, some of which has been improperly used. Furthermore, such a concentration of power heightens political competition for the office of prime minister, preventing speedy and effective coalition building processes in post-election periods. Because Iraq uses a system of proportional representation, no one party is ever likely to gain a majority in an election. Therefore, a process of cross-party coalition building must follow every election. In these negotiations all parties angle for the position of prime minister, because this is seen as the only position that matters. This zero sum game prevents the efficient transfer of power, leaving the country vulnerable to political instability after every election.

Still, the optimists argue that consociational democratic systems do not always produce unstable political situations that hinder democratic development. For example, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium have all experienced successful consociational democratic systems. After War World II, Belgium faced difficulties in building a stable democratic system for a long period of time. Today, however, Belgium is considered one of the most successful stable consociational democratic systems in Europe, despite its division into “58% Flemish-speakers” and “41% French-speakers.” The constitutional revisions that began in 1970 enhanced its democratic development and stability over time. Despite its occasional ethnic, economic, and political challenges, Belgium is considered a typical example of a successful consociational democratic system, though it took quite a long time for the nation to reach this state (see Pales 2011, 22-31). Recently, as part of the United Nations Special Envoy to Libya, Bernardino Leon, presented an initiative for the disputing parties in Libya to resolve their civil conflict. The core of Leon’s initiative derives from consociational democracy. Leon offers veto rights to all parties, even those with no seats in parliament, in order to distribute power more equally in the government and the parliament. It is worth noting that the majority of Libyans (90% percent of the population) belong to the same race, and the division between parties is not based on ethnicity. Rather, the conflict between the fighting parties has to do with losing parties not respecting and accepting the results of

elections and democratic transitions. There are deep concerns among some Libyans that this initiative might damage future democratic development, and increase the level of tension and instability (UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya 2015).

However, given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic, it is difficult to say for sure. This study contributes to and updates the existing debate between optimists and pessimists on the effect of new consociational democratic systems in deeply divided societies. This study builds upon previous research by reexamining the effectiveness of new consociational democratic systems to end conflict and enhance stability in deeply divided societies by employing case study.

This project proceeds in the following manner: it begins with an examination of the existing literature on the effect of the new consociational democracies on stability and external intervention within deeply divided societies. Next, I develop a theory, which argues that new consociational democratic systems contribute to instability in these societies as well as motivate intervention from regional states when ethnic minorities are divided between different countries in the region. Finally, I address my case study and analyze the effect of new consociational democracies on neighboring intervention, and stability in deeply divided societies.

Literature Review

In the existing literature, there are three main subjects relevant to the current study. The first subject represents the classical arguments about the effect of ethnic divisions on stability and internal dispute within states, addressing different causes of conflicts. The second focus of the literature discusses the positive and negative effects of consociational democracy as a typical institutional solution for bringing stability and ending conflict in divided societies. The third portion of the literature focuses on the effect of ethnic fragmentation in the region on cross-regional stability and conflict. Most literature agrees that there are great challenges for divided societies to build stable political systems that satisfy all ethnic minorities, yet there is a lack of studies that examine the effect of adopting consociational democratic system on states' stability when the ethnic groups are divided among multiple states in the region.

Ethnicities and conflict:

Most states around the world consist of various multicultural and multiethnic societies. Sometimes, such plurality leads to disputes between different groups and ethnicities, especially when there is an absence of effective management. However, heterogeneity does not always prevent people from living together. The question of why some multiethnic

societies can have stable political institutions and some cannot has been under investigation by different schools in conflict management and other fields for some time. Some of the most prominent work on stability within plural societies has been done by Horowitz (1985), who studied the relationship between conflict and ethnicity. Horowitz (1985) claims that there are links between deep ethnic divides in society and the likelihood of disputes. The author argues that language, race, religion, and any other heterogeneity among people make coexistence difficult. In such societies, democracy is more likely to fail, and political parties are more likely to be established based on ethnicities. Political competition is much harder because voters are motivated by their ethnicities, and not by healthy political competition based on the effectiveness of different political platforms. In these societies, ethnicity is a main concern of voters, and voters of the ethnic majority want to dominate over minority voters and prevent their equal participation and power sharing (Horowitz 1985). Simonsen (2005) claims that:

Where the lines of an armed conflict coincide with ethnic boundaries, the salience of ethnicity increases. The boundaries between ethnic groups may have been clearly delineated long before a conflict breaks out, with low interaction between groups and low rates of ethnic re-identification or marriage across ethnic boundaries; still, much is destroyed when the social dynamics of armed conflict start to unfold. Other identities – such as regional, gender, or class identities – fade in significance, and ethnicity, when it marks the line between warring parties, becomes the all-dominant marker. (Simonsen 2005, 299).

Ethnic conflict has gained more attention since the end of the Cold War. Samuel Huntington (1993) argues that disagreement between multiple cultures might lead to a clash of civilizations. Huntington (1993) refers to the clashes between different cultures within a state and the clashes among different nations. From his point of view, increased levels of communication between different cultures leads to an increase in the level of differences between different groups, which might lead to conflict. In reality, Huntington's argument is unrealistic because there is no way to empirically prove that more communication between different groups and cultures might lead to conflict (Huntington 1993). Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) suggest that there is no critical proof that the differences between different groups, societies, and civilizations increase the probability of disputes and violence (Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000). However, internal conflict might exist when the socioeconomic and political arrangement is challenged by divided societies (Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012).

Other scholars argue that there is a correlation between the availability of natural resources and ethnic conflict. Humphreys (2005) argues that divided nations that are highly dependent on natural resources and agricultural production are prone to civil wars in the event of an imbalance in the distribution of wealth and production. When one or more ethnic groups is dissatisfied with the status quo because other ethnic groups or the majority ethnic group benefits from the status quo at their expense, the internal dispute will escalate. As far as the importance of economic inequality In addition to economic factors, religious differences are another significant factor that may lead to an escalation of conflict. Reynal-Querol (2002) addresses the effect of high levels of religious heterogeneity on civil conflict, claiming that high religious fragmentation within divided societies makes them more prone to internal conflict than states divided based on access to resources, language divisions, or political interest groups. This intensity of religious conflict is due to the fixed nature of religion, as it is not an issue that people can compromise on. Rummel (1997) adds that when the political regime supports one ethnicity's religion over others, the escalation of violent civil conflict and instability is more likely (Rummel 1997). Nguyen (2010) surprisingly disagrees with Rummel (1997) and claims that his study shows no significant effect of religion on ethnic conflict. The author argues that "At a certain level of religious diversity, there exists some type of tolerance or acceptance between different religious groups that decreases the likelihood of conflict" (Nguyen 2010, 6).

However, Reynal-Querol (2002), agreeing with Rummel, argues that: There are two basic reasons why religious differences can generate more violence than other social cleavages. First, there is no doubt of the exclusivity of religion. One can speak two or more languages, but you can have only one religion...Second, religious differences, which are the basis of differences among civilizations, imply different ways of understanding the world, social relationships, and so on. (Reynal-Querol 2002, 32).

Constitutionalism argues that political institutions matter in bringing peace and stability in divided societies. Political institutions, such as consociational versus majoritarian political systems, proportional representation versus first-past-the-post electoral systems, and federal versus unitary governments, can explain why some divided societies have stability and peace and others do not. Horowitz (2014) claims that consociational and centripetal systems are two commonly suggested methods to build stable political systems in divided societies (Horowitz

2014). Belay (2013) adds that power-sharing systems can provide representation and power sharing to each significant minority for issues that are important to them (Belay 2013). Horowitz (2002) argues that in order to build stable political institutions for extremely divided societies, one way is to include people with extreme points of view in a dispensation. This method is helpful in ending the conflict by offering opportunity for those who have been against the prevailing system of ethnic politics to contribute to transforming it. The goal of this approach is to co-opt the extremes and change their behaviors by motivating them to participate and benefit from compromise. Moreover, the second method offers cooperation for those parties that are based on ethnicities. By building coalitions, ethnic parties can express cooperation and fend off extremists who are not willing to compromise. This approach aims to marginalize the extremists by motivating ethnic parties to benefit from compromise and the public good (Horowitz (2002).

Consociational democracy:

One important challenge for conflict management scholars is to find ways for divided societies to live together under one political institution. Plural societies and societies that have experienced civil wars share similar characteristics. Increasing the level of cooperation in such societies is a great challenge because they are shaped by ideological, regional, racial, cultural, religious, and ethnic cleavages. The members of such societies direct their loyalty to their groups or segments rather than to the state as a whole. Therefore, divided societies are fragmented and ethnic groups have little room for cooperation and compromise. In addition, security in divided societies and post-conflict societies is also challenging. Most of the time cooperation is extremely difficult because levels of trust are low and feuding parties are not willing to give up their weapons (Binningsbø 2006). Binningsbø claims that “the great task is therefore to design a layout of the future which ‘convince the combatants to shed their partisan armies and surrendered territory even though such steps will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the treaty’s other term... these security concerns are best ensured within a power-sharing arrangement where antagonists are guaranteed positions within the postconflict state” (Binningsbø 2006).

In his early studies, Lijphart argues that the best solution to bring divided societies together is to design an institution that provides equal opportunity for all parties to follow their interest. His assumptions come from the examples of states such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria, who all managed to build stable political institutions despite their

divided subcultures. Lijphart and his supporters argue that instituting political arrangements can stabilize deeply divided societies by giving ethnic groups the chance to peacefully compete at the level of political elites. In addition, the legitimacy of states in divided nations can be only legitimized when the systems include all their segments (Elleboudt 2007). In his book, *The Politics of Accommodation* (1976) and his article “Consociational Democracy” (1969), Lijphart presents his most common typologies of democratic systems, categorizing them into majoritarian systems and consociational systems. Lijphart argues that majoritarian systems are not appropriate for divided societies because, in these situations, the winner takes all and the loser gets nothing. The author argues that winner-takes-all approaches will not encourage stability in divided societies, specifically after civil wars (Lijphart 1968, 1969). Lijphart proposes that mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy are three characteristics of consociational democracy that can bring stability for fragmented societies (see Lijphart, 1968). Elleboudt (2007) addresses this: Consociationalism relies on four crucial elements: Government by a « grand coalition» of all significant segments, meaning of the most important ethnic groups; attribution of group autonomy to the subcultures, in order to let them deal with issues that concern them solely; proportionality for allocating political representation (and thus fair distribution of public funds and civil service positions); minority veto to protect the vital interests of the minorities. Such veto is needed to avoid outvoting or overruling by the majority, and usually consists in a special voting quorum, which has to be reached in certain issues where vital interests of the minority are at stake (Elleboudt 2007, 6). Lijphart (1969) argues that even though consociational democratic systems violate the principle of majoritarian democratic rule, they still hold to the core of normative democratic principles. He claims that consociational democracy requires the political elites to have the willingness and ability to compromise and “accommodate the divergent interests and demand for subcultures,” as well as be willing to cooperate and join a common effort in order to overcome cleavages and rival subcultures. It also requires political elites’ commitment to maintain stability in the political system and understand that the alternative to consociational democratic systems is internal dispute and more fragmentation (Lijphart 1969). The advantages of consociational democracy for fragmented societies are numerous. For example, consociational systems encourage unity within

societies rather than potential secessionist groups because public participation and power sharing is guaranteed at all levels of political decision-making. Moreover, their veto rights protects their interests (Elleboudt 2007). Yet, despite these advantages, consociational democratic theory has received many critiques from different scholars, of which I will mention some of the more prominent ones.

Taylor (2006) critiques consociational democracy, arguing that it does not lead to moderate political democratic systems, but rather, to a centrifugal mechanism that moves people to more extreme political parties (Taylor 2006). Horowitz (2002) mentions that, in divided societies, political parties' main goal is to empower themselves at the expense of other parties because they want to fight harder for their ethnicities. Such a situation creates an unhealthy environment for political competition and moves parties toward extremes, making them less likely to compromise with other ethnic parties (Horowitz 2002). In addition, Elleboudt (2007) argues that consociational democracy can encourage separatist tendencies among ethnic minorities. The author maintains that when they gain more autonomy, external support from neighboring states will encourage these ethnic minorities to separate. Moreover, power-sharing systems in divided societies "encourage ethnic identification and accentuate inter-group differences." Furthermore, consociational democratic systems encourage leaders to play the ethnic minority card to gain power when they run for office or to gain popularity (Elleboudt 2007).

In addition, Fakhoury-Mühlbacher (2008) questions whether the theory of power-sharing and consociational democracy holds to democratic principles or not. The author argues that successful consociational democratic systems and their links with stability have not yet been empirically tested. In addition, the author states that these systems are most likely to succeed when the surrounding environment is relatively healthy and stable (Fakhoury-Mühlbacher 2008). Elleboudt (2007) argues that in order for a consociational democracy to function, it requires some level of unity within divided societies, such as agreement about leadership and political organization. Since ethnic minorities with conflicting ideological or religious beliefs tend not to compromise on their metaphysical concept of good, it is often difficult for them to cooperate. Moreover, language also makes it harder for different ethnic groups to agree upon a single leader or organize themselves under a single political organization. Such a situation increases the level of competition at the expense of cooperation (Elleboudt 2007).

Ethnic fragmentation and cross-regional stability:

Political institutions in divided societies, in many instances, are affected by the environment of the region in which they are positioned. If the countries in the region have stability and prosperity, the political regimes in these societies are more likely to be positively impacted. On the other hand, when the whole region has high levels of instability, competition, and fragmentation, political institutions in divided societies are less likely to succeed. The link between stability in divided societies and the regional states is explained by the fact that, often, ethnic minorities are spread out across different states in the region. Therefore, there is a linear relationship between stability in the region and stability within a particular state in that region. Manis (2015) argues that power is the ability of a state to enhance its influence on other countries to gain political interest. States can enhance their power and change the behavior of other states using either hard power or soft power.

The current situation in the Middle East is one important example of how ethnic minorities scattered among different states have influenced divided societies, specifically those states that adopt consociational democratic systems. The division and dispute between Shiites and Sunnis is deeply rooted in history, and it has divided Muslim nations for centuries. Yet, the dispute between both camps has also had a great impact on stability and cooperation between Muslim nations. Alshaikh (2014) argues that after Britain withdrew from the Middle East and North Africa in 1971, the United States' foreign policy was shaped upon the guaranteed free flow of oil to the West and guaranteed security of Israel. During the Cold War, the West perceived Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution as a great threat to its interests and allies in the region. Barzegar (2010) builds upon Alshaikh's (2014) argument, claiming that from the very beginning Iran adopted an aggressive relationship with its neighbors aiming to export the Iranian revolution to its neighboring countries. Iranian foreign policy threatens Sunni states in the Middle East and creates hostile relationships in the region. Both Shiites and Sunnis view themselves as the rightful leaders of the Muslim world. In the 1980s, the Western powers supported Saddam Hussein in order to undermine the strength of Iran and balance the regional power in the Middle East. Moreover, Alshaikh (2014) indicates that the Iran-Iraq war weakened Iran and empowered Saddam Hussein, but led Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the international community military intervention of 1990-91, and the end of Cold War, began a new stage of relationships in the Middle East. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, a new form of

relationships between Iraq and Iran was established. Iraqi Shiites and Kurds turned a new page in their strategic relationship with Iran, shifting the balance of power in the region in Iran's favor. Iraq, after Saddam Hussein, moved from the Sunni side to the Shiite side, creating a new, although negative, regional order. Barzegar (2010) states that the changes in the balance of power in the Middle East and North Africa from 1979 until 2015 have resulted in insecurity, instability, confrontation, and tension between the states in the region (Barzegar 2010).

Iran not only benefited from removing Saddam Hussein from power and establishing close allies with the Shiite government in Iraq, but also established a close relationship with Syria and ethnic Shiite minorities in the Middle East in order to empower itself and the Shiite camp. Chalala (1990) argues that the relationship between Syria and Iran must be understood from an ideological perspective. Syria's political system is considered Alawites, which is an offshoot of Shiite Islam. Syria's political system shares similar strategic political interests with Iran's Revolution, including shared foreign policies and an opposition to Israel and the US. Syria still has not retrieved the Golan Heights from Israel and has not reached a permanent peace agreement with Israel. Syria and Iran also share similar interests with Lebanon, with all supporting the Shiite minority. Syria and Iran support Hezbollah and provide for it militarily and financially against Israel and against the Sunni majority in Lebanon. Divided societies in nondemocratic states lead leaders to be more aggressive against ethnic minorities. Katulis and Juul (2014) argue that most of the Gulf States, specifically those countries with Shiites minorities, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, see Shiites minorities as threats to their security and their political stability. Leaders in the Gulf States believe that Shiites minorities are actually pawns of Iran. As a result, the Gulf States see Iran as a direct threat, and are disgruntled towards its sponsorship of terrorist groups in the region and its nuclear program. The conflicting relationship between the two camps is demonstrated in their confrontations and their opposing support in the ongoing civil wars and tensions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain. The authors claim that "Iran clearly supports Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad against rebels that include...among others...Sunni jihadi groups backed by some elements in the Gulf, such as the ISIS, al-Nusra Front, and Ahrar al-Sham. For its part, Hezbollah has justified its intervention in Syria's civil war in part on sectarian grounds, claiming to protect Shiite Holy Sites." After the Arab Spring, the new situation in the Middle East has created new arenas for regional powers to influence (Katulis and Juul 2014). For

example, Carley (2005) argues that the city of Ankara does not have a smooth relationship with its neighbors. In fact, the Kurds' issue with Iraq, Iran, and Syria is one of the biggest concerns for Turkey. This issue goes back to Atatürk's Dictum that only the "Turkish nation lived within the borders of the republic." This situation leads the Kurds to fight for their rights in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. So far, the Turkish government has solely used military means to resolve this problem. The Kurdish issue has been used by different players in the region to gain political and economic interest. Turkey had a better relationship with Iraq before the 1991 Gulf War, but after Turkey participated in the embargo against Iraq, the relationship between both states deteriorated. Moreover, the 1979 Iranian Revolution damaged the relationship between Turkey and Iran, since the two states have different Islamic ideologies which distanced any economic and political partnerships. In addition, Larrabee and Nader (2013) argue that another issue of tension between Turkey and Iran is their competition to have leverage over the Iraqi government. Turkey has a strong interest in the political stability in Iraq and does not want Iraq to form an alliance with Iran. Political competition over Iraq between Turkey and Iran is concerning for both sides. Both players support different political parties in Iraq, making it difficult for the political regime to function and provide equal service to all Iraqis (Larrabee and Nader 2013).

In the literature review, I have discussed the most common arguments about political institutions, conflict management, ethnic division, and stability in divided societies. The literature focuses on the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the stability and conflict within states, as well as the different causes of disputes between ethnic minorities in divided societies. The literature also addresses the effectiveness of adopting a consociational democracy system in bringing stability and ending conflict. It also discusses power sharing and the positive and negative effects of adopting a consociational democracy for divided societies. However, the literature completely ignores the effect of adopting consociational democratic system in divided societies on the level of external intervention when ethnic minorities are divided between different states in the region. Moreover, the literature does not address the effect of consociational democracy on levels of instability, such as internal political crises and tensions, when ethnic minorities are divided between different states in the region. The literature also does not highlight the effect of state instability on regional instability and intrastate disputes when ethnic minorities are divided between different countries in the region. Finally, the literature does not examine the effect of adopting non-fully consociational democratic systems on the functionality

of political regimes in divided societies where ethnic minorities are divided between different states in the region.

Theory, Hypothesis, and methodology

The political regime of consociational democracy is “considered a typical political system that can bring minority groups in divided societies together under one political institution. Undoubtedly, consociational democracy is effective in bringing some level of stability in certain situations” (Hiba 2015). However, the democratic development in deeply divided societies is questionable under this political institution. There are cases where these systems have failed altogether at reaching these goals. Therefore, even when consociational democracy has been adopted, some divided societies still experience instability due to political disagreements between “ethnic groups within the state or even the region if the ethnic groups have cross-regional links. In consociational democratic systems, when ethnic minorities are divided between different countries in the region, they are not isolated from their regional environment. Instability in the region, such as civil war, interstate disputes, and deep political competitions can have a great effect on the stability within the new consociational democratic states” (Hiba 2015). This study proposes that new democratic consociational political systems are most likely to experience intervention from neighboring states when one or more of the nation’s ethnic minorities is divided between different countries in the region. Divided societies with new democratic consociational political systems (or partial democratic systems) are more prone to intervention from neighboring states in these situations. Ethnic minorities tend to seek allies among neighboring countries that contain the same ethnic groups in order to protect themselves and maintain their power. In addition, consociational democratic systems provide opportunities for external intervention when ethnic minorities, often tied to similar ethnic groups across the region, are guaranteed veto rights within government and parliament. Such a situation opens the door for neighboring states’ intervention when necessary. The division in the Middle East is a great example of how states strategize to protect their interests by supporting ethnic minorities with which they have links. “The conflicts between Shiite and Sunni have been occurring for a long time. The majority of Shiite states support the Shiite minority within majority Sunni states. Likewise, Sunni majority states support the Sunni minority within majority Shiite states” (Hiba 2015). For example, Iran’s majority Shiite population has allied with Syria, Iraq, and Shiite minorities in Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates. By the same token, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and,

Kuwait, and the Sunni majority countries in the Middle East, “are allied against the Shiite camp and in support of Sunni minorities in areas with a Shiite majority. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait acted shortly after Iran openly supported the Shiite majority in Bahrain to bring down the minority Sunni Regime in Bahrain. Bahrain had major protests in favor of a democratic transition. Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates sent military troops into Bahrain to support their ally, the Sunni minority government” (Hiba 2015).

Changing the Bahraini regime in favor of the Shiite majority would lead to changes in the balance of power in the region in favor of Iran and the Shiite camp, weakening the Sunnis' side. From a Sunni perspective, the Iranian Islamic Revolution will spread in the region specifically in those states that have Shiite minorities such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, the mass demonstration in Bahrain attempting to change the political regime is a red line for the Gulf States. The Gulf States' military intervention was necessary in order to ensure their survival and maintain the balance of power in the region. However, it is important to mention that even though the Gulf States' military intervention in Bahrain was helpful to keep the Sunni minority in power, it negatively affected the stability in Bahrain by increasing the level of hostility between the different ethnic minorities (Hiba 2015).

The Sunni and Shiite in Yemen have a similar situation to Bahrain. After the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was forced out, Iran and the Gulf States engaged directly in the conflict between the Sunni and Shiite groups. “Iran openly stands with Shiite Houthis to take over, and also supports Shiite Houthis' militias financially, militarily, and logistically. The Iranian intervention led the Gulf States to build a Sunni military coalition in the region to fight Shiite Houthis' militias in order to empower Sunni camps in the region against Shiite allies” (Hiba 2015). “The civil war in Syria in 2011 was a great opportunity for the Gulf States to change the political system in Syria, which has been a strong ally of Iran for a long time. Empowering the Sunni camp and weakening the Iranian-Syrian axis and the Shiite camp in general has been the goal for the Gulf States and other Sunni states in the region from the very beginning of the revolution in Syria. The Gulf States and their allies in the region support the so-called Free Modern Syrians militarily, financially, and logistically” (Hiba 2015). “The Gulf States and their allies have supported Syrian opposition by estab-

Gulf Cooperation Council and stopping the violence against Syrian people. It has been clear from the very beginning that the goal of the intervention was not to support democratic development in Syria, but rather to bring down the Shiite government and establish Sunni power. On the other hand, Iran, Hezbollah, and other Shiite militias from Iraq have also engaged in the proxy civil war in Syria in order to protect their alliance with Bashar al-Assad, and keep the balance of power in the region” (Hiba 2015).

Moreover, Iran, a majoritarian Shiite state, benefits from the structures of the consociational democratic systems in Iraq and Lebanon. The intervention of Iran and Shiite minorities in Iraq and Lebanon to fulfill Iranian interests ensures that Shiites keep their power. Alireza Nader (2015) states that:

Since Saddam’s fall, the Iranian government has pursued three distinct avenues of influence in Iraqi politics: Promoting its religious influence and propagating Shiism. Positioning itself as the main arbitrator of Iraqi political disputes. Iran helps its various allies gain power through Iraq’s political process, and then acts to balance them against one another, eventually serving as the power broker to resolve the very disputes that it often played a role in causing. Calibrating violent activity among loyal Shi’a militias as a means of pressuring political actors ...The religious bonds between Iran and Iraq serve an important role in Iran’s national security ... Iran’s policy of maintaining influence in Iraq is to form Shiite -led centralized governments while making sure they do not become too powerful. Thus, Iranian influence is strong within the central government and among non-governmental actors that challenge central authority. Iran has been adept at taking advantage of Iraq’s parliamentary system, in which coalitions are needed to govern. Tehran has benefited from convincing the Shi’a to run on unified lists to take advantage of their demographic strength in Iraqi elections (Alireza Nader 2015, 3, 5).

Not only do consociational democratic systems motivate neighboring states to intervene in domestic issues, but they also encourage instability and confrontation between ethnic minorities, political elites and political parties. This study proposes that new democratic consociational political systems within divided societies are more likely to experience instability and lack of security when one or more ethnic minorities is divided between different countries in the region. New consociational democratic systems enhance the sectarian formula at the societal and governmental level, leading the

elements for disagreement between different political elites, ethnic minorities, and political parties. The complexity of the structure of consociational democratic systems encourages ethnic minorities to express their disagreement violently, especially if they are divided among different states in the region. For example, when consociational political systems guarantee the mutual veto for ethnic minorities in parliament and in the government, the political system at the legislative and executive level will be frozen. The alternative for ethnic minorities is to express their differences violently because the mechanism of legislative and executive action is disabled. These systems make it difficult for states to move forward because achieving consensus on government decisions and parliamentary legislation is often near impossible. Thus, these theoretical arguments lead us to the hypotheses that this study intends to examine.

H1- New democratic consociational political systems within divided societies are more likely to experience intervention from neighboring states when one or more ethnic minorities is divided among different countries in the region.

H2- New democratic consociational political systems within divided societies are more likely to experience instability and lack of security when one or more ethnic minorities is divided among different countries in the region.

Case study selection

This study aims to examine the effect of adopting democratic consociational political systems in deeply divided societies on the intervention of neighboring states and the state's instability when one or more ethnic minorities is divided among different countries in the region. This study employs case studies to examine the effect of new democratic consociational political systems in deeply divided societies on these outcomes. This study employs similar systems method to select cases and examine the validity of the hypotheses. This study will focus on Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan. I chose to include Lebanon based on its deep division of social groups and its adoption of a new democratic consociational political systems. Lebanon has adopted a consociational political system since 1989. This study also selects Kyrgyzstan as a new democratic state as well as a divided society that has adopted majoritarian political system since 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. I will examine the hypotheses of this study within each of these states as well as compare and contrast the effect of the between the cases study. I believe that my theory can be examined using these states, which will allow me to observe whether consociational democratic systems have a different effect that majoritarian democratic

systems on neighboring states intervention and internal instability when ethnic minorities are divided among different states in the region. The states selected for this study share many similarities, including being divided societies, being new democracies, age, population size, and location in terms of connection with neighboring ethnic minorities and states. However, both states adopted different political systems, whereas Lebanon has adopted a consociational democratic system since 1989 and the Kyrgyzstan has adopted majoritarian political system since 1991. This difference will allow this study to examine the hypotheses and compare and contrast both states in terms of internal stability and neighboring states interventions in internal affairs.

Lebanon

Lebanon is a divided state which includes many ethnic minorities, but namely Druze, Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians. This division was the motivation behind the adoption of the consociational democratic system in 1989. The aim was to establish a distribution of power and power sharing to enhance stability, security, and democracy in the future. However, Lebanon's consociational democratic system has not brought security and stability, but rather has created a mechanism to destabilize the country, opening the door for neighboring states' intervention. The Lebanese Civil War and its complex disputes "from 1975 until 1990, along with the Syrian regime's direct-armed intervention during that time ultimately led to] the establishment of a consociational democratic system after the difficult negotiations of the Taif Agreement. This political system divided the Lebanese into three camps: 1) the Shiite camp, which was supported by Syria, Iran, and eventually Iraq; 2) the Sunni camp, which was supported by the Gulf States and other Sunni majority states in the region; and 3) the Christians' camp, which was divided between Shiite and Sunni camps" (Blanchard,2014, 1). The consociational political system in Lebanon after the Taif agreement has created not only religious sectarian rivalry, but also political elites that benefit from the system because it "preserves their own personal interests. These factors, combined with the tensions that have accompanied regional conflicts and ideological struggles, overshadow limited progress toward what some Lebanese hold as an alternative ideal—a non-[consociational] political system" (Blanchard,2014, 1). Soon after Lebanon adopted the consociational democratic system, the Lebanese political system became completely dependent on the Syrian regime to enhance stability and security. In addition, the government in Lebanon usually needs approval from the Syrian regime in decision making. The period of time from 1991 to 2005 is considered an unstable period in terms

of security and stability, as well as a period of external intervention in Lebanon. The Syrian intervention was not only implemented to provide security to Lebanon, but also to control the Lebanese political system both internally and through foreign politics. During this time, Syria and Iran were the dominant domestic players in Lebanon that decided whether Lebanon should have peace internally and externally. Iran and Syria's political and security leverage over Lebanon not only increased their power in the region, but it also helped Syria and Iran to appear strong in negotiations with Israel over Golan Heights and the Arab-Israeli peace deal in 1991. Iran and Syria dominated control of Lebanon, and their strong ally with Hezbollah and the Shiite minority made any negotiation peace settlement between Arab and Israel impossible without considering Iranian and Syrian conditions. Instability in Lebanon was a game used by Iran and Syria to achieve political gain in the region. In 1993, Iran and Syria motivated their close ally, Hezbollah to launch an attack on Israeli troops in Lebanon because the agreement between Palestinians and Israelis was not comprehensive and it did not include Israel's withdraw from Golan Heights, the Syrian land occupied by Israel since 1967. In 1996, Israel launched "Operation Grapes of Wrath" against the Lebanese, leading the Syrian leader, Hafez Al Assad, to offer a negotiated peace agreement with Israel to resolve the Syrian-Israel conflict and the Lebanon-Israel confrontation. However, the negotiations did not produce what was anticipating (Salloukh 2014).

In 2000, Israel announced its withdrawal from Lebanon. However, Israel's withdrawal decreased the hope for Syria to acquire the Golan Heights from Israel. Therefore, Syria motivated the Lebanese government to continue the demand for Shebaa Farms, which was considered by the UN to be part of the Syrian Golan Heights, and it is considered by the Syrian government to be part of Lebanon. Syria and Iran motivated Hezbollah to threaten Israel and launch attacks on Israeli troops in order to send a message to Israel that a peace agreement cannot occur without Syria and Iran. The Syrian-Iranian intervention in Lebanon is not only politically motivated, but also economically. Syria acts as proxy for Iran in Lebanon, and Hezbollah and the Amal Movement parties act as proxy for Syria and Iran. The consociational democratic system in Lebanon enhanced the early relationship between ethnic minorities in Lebanon and ethnic minorities in states in the Middle East. The consociational democratic system within a divided society was a typical system for intra-regime alliances in Lebanon during the period from 1990 to 2005. It was strengthened by business relations between Syrian and Iranian governments entrepreneurs and

Lebanese leaders who were loyal to Iran and Syria. The system led these nations to not only control the political behavior of Lebanon, but also control the Lebanese economy and make political and economic decision for Lebanon (Salloukh 2014).

In addition, after Lebanese signed the Taif agreement, the Syrian-Iranian political intervention has increased in Lebanon. Before Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, it was not allowed for political elites to publicly demand the implementation of the Taif agreement because Taif agreement includes Syria withdraw its army from Lebanon. Withdraw Syria's army from Lebanon would shrink the Syrian-Iranian political leverage in Lebanon and lead to withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon. Syria controls most of the political elites who might not adopt political behaviors in favor of the Syrian and Iranian agenda in the region. "The Christian Phalange Party was overtaken from within, and its leadership recomposed of pro-Syrian cadres; the Lebanese Forces were banned and their leader Samir Geagea imprisoned, on charges of orchestrating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rachid Karami. The supporters of the exiled Michel Aoun were hounded. Trusted Lebanese lieutenants, but always under Syrian supervision, oversaw the doctrine of the Lebanese Army along pro-Syrian lines" (Salloukh 2014, 3). In addition, from 1990 to 2005, the top Syrian regime officials played an important role in appointing the president, prime minister, and members of the cabinet in Lebanon. After pressure from the US and UN for the Syrian government to withdraw from Lebanon, the Syrian president decided to challenge the UN and US, renewing Lahoud's presidency and refusing to withdraw from Syria. Sunni leaders and Gulf States leaders found an opportunity to raise their voices together against Syrian-Iranian intervention in internal affairs in Lebanon and balance the ethnic power in Lebanon as well as in the region. Rafik Hariri, a Sunni leader given support from Gulf States, France, and the US, decided to engage in a confrontation with the Syrian-Iranian coalition in Lebanon in 2005. After his assassination, the conflict between different ethnic sects in Lebanon, and external pressure from US, UN, and France led the Syrian regime to withdraw from Lebanon in 2005 (Salloukh 2014). However, after Syria withdrew its military, a new chapter of instability and regional states intervention began in Lebanon. Lebanon's political coalition reform changed the political game dramatically after assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February, and regional states increased their intervention and political struggles in Lebanon. After 2005, Lebanon became divided deeply into two camps: the first camp is called "March 8" referring to the mass demonstration led by pro-Syria and Iran supporters.

The coalition includes the Maronite Christian Free Patriotic Movement, the Shiite Muslim Amal Movement, and Hezbollah, along with some other small parties. On the other hand, the second camp is called "March 14" referring to the mass demonstration led by anti-Syria and Iran activists. This coalition includes the Christian Lebanese Forces, FPM party, Phalange party, Druze party, and other small parties and political elites (Blanchard 2014, 1).

The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon opened the door for other regional power states to intervene. The Gulf States have openly increased their support to Sunni political parties and the Sunni minority in Lebanon. On the other hand, Syria and Iran also increased their support to the Shiite political parties, the Shiite minority, and political elite allies in Lebanon. Hezbollah has received massive support from Iran and Syria, including weapons and military training. Thus, the consociational political system in Lebanon has created obvious opportunity for eternal intervention from neighboring states based on the ethnic divisions in the region.

Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon the political Sunni-Shiite struggle has increased and the deep hostility between two camps may drive them to a new civil war. In addition, the political struggles both within Lebanon and in the region led to further instability from 2006 to 2008. "In July 2006, between 1,000 and 1,200 deaths resulted from clashes between Hezbollah and Israel. In 2007, between 300 and 500 deaths resulted from clashes between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam. In May 2008, clashes between the army and anti-government militias resulted in over 80 deaths" (David Carment 2013, 2). In 2008, Hezbollah militia attacked the Sunni "dominated West Beirut and Druze areas of Mount Lebanon killing nearly 100 Lebanese" (Elias 2011, 29.) The Hezbollah attack "decreased the legitimacy of Hezbollah and increased sectarian divisions. The decision by the Lebanese government to shutdown Hezbollah's private land-communications network was perceived as a threat to its operations and resulted in a nationwide military campaign against the government" (Martin 2012, 26). By this attack, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran achieved political gain by preventing the March 14 coalition, led by Saïd Hariri, a Sunni leader supported by the Gulf States, from achieving their political objectives of appointing a new president. Hezbollah also domestically and externally changed the political roles and norms within the Lebanese political institution and imposed "the right to one-third of cabinet members. By having this one-third Hezbollah can constitutionally dissolve the government if it decides to withdraw its Cabinet members. This guaranteed Hezbollah influence over all government decision making. Many accused

Hezbollah of seeking a new form of power sharing system” (Elias 2011, 29).

It is worth noting that the political struggle in Lebanon between Shiite and Sunni can be understood from the regional context and confrontation between Shiite and Sunni in the Middle East. From the very beginning after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran adopted an aggressive relationship with its neighbors aiming to export its revolution to its neighboring countries. Iranian foreign policy threatens Sunni states in the Middle East and creates hostile relationships in the region. Both Shiites and Sunnis view themselves as the rightful leaders of the Muslim world (Alshaikh’s 2014). Therefore, targeting states with a Shiite minority is the strategic goal for Iran and Syria. At the same time, targeting states with a Sunni minority is the strategic goal for the Sunni camp in the region. Until 2015, Lebanon was divided between two camps each of which has allies in the region: the March 8th coalition, which is supported by Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Shiite minorities in the region, and the March 14 coalition, which is supported heavily from the Gulf States and other Sunni states in the region. In addition, the Gulf States and other Sunni states in the Middle East and North Africa have concern about the increasing influence of Iran in Lebanon through Hezbollah and other political parties. The Gulf States and other Sunni states in the Middle East and North Africa believe that Iran is empowering the Shiites against the Sunnis in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait. Moreover, because of the above fragmentation and internal and external confrontation, Lebanese’s foreign policy has no clear direction (Alshaikh’s 2014).

The security and stability in Lebanon consociational sectarian political system is also negatively affected by the conflict in the region. The conflict in Syria has a great effect on Lebanon because of the fragmented relationship between the political parties and ethnicities in Lebanon and the Syrian regime. The Civil war in Syria has led to an increase in the levels of hostility between different ethnicities and political parties in Lebanon. Lebanon’s instability is due to Iranian support for Hezbollah, and Gulf States’ support of Sunni militia in Syria and Gulf States’ support for Sunni minorities and political parties in Lebanon. This situation has led to political deadlock and postponement presidential elections. Also important, the Syrian Civil War led to tens of thousand Sunni Syrian refugees to settle temporarily in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s concern is that Syrian refugees in Lebanon might tip the sectarian balance in Lebanon in favor of the Sunni camp, which might lead to a decrease in Hezbollah’s power and a decrease in Syrian-Iranian political leverage in Lebanon. In addition, “although

Assad withdrew his military forces from Lebanon in 2005, Syria continues to heavily influence internal events within Lebanon. As the Syrian opposition continues to battle supporters of Assad both in Syria and in Lebanon, the propensity for conflict to spill over further will remain high and drag Lebanon closer into what is quickly becoming a full-blown regional conflict. Hezbollah remains one of the main antagonists preventing Lebanon from isolating itself from the current conflict in Syria” (Young, Stebbins, Frederick, and Al-shahery 2014, 26).

Drawing on support from Iran and Syria, it has polarized the political landscape within Lebanon. Iran’s continued support of Hezbollah and the Assad regime has increased the flow of arms between Lebanon and Syria’s northern borders. Reports suggest that Hezbollah, fearing a possible regime collapse in Syria, has moved many of its long-range missiles back into Lebanon to prevent the oppositions’ access to them. External support to Hezbollah and its subsequent direct involvement in the Syrian conflict have brought it into direct contact with Jabhat al-Nusra, which is Sunni militant group, which has been linked to al-Qaida, is not only conducting a series of attacks against the Syrian regime in support of the Free Syrian Army, but also has been targeting Hezbollah from within Lebanon’s borders. The actions of Jabhat al-Nusra have also renewed the vigor of Lebanon’s internal Sunni jihadist groups, which were not empowered to challenge the Lebanese National Army or Hezbollah before its combination of events has fueled the rate at which the conflict is spreading into Lebanon and the region (Young, Stebbins, Frederick, and Al-shahery 2014, 26,27).

In addition, Syria and Iran’s support of Hezbollah is based not only on ideology, but also on their strategic calculation to empower themselves in the Middle East. The strategic alliance between Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria, provided Iran with political cover, enabling it to become an influential power in the region. The Tehran relationship with Syria over Lebanon makes Iran a powerful player in any peace negotiation to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. “There are always different types of conflict, fragmentations, and deep political struggles internally within Lebanese society and between political elites within the system. In addition, external conflict between the Sunni and Shiite camps in the region reflects a negative outcome in stability and confrontation between different ethnic

parties in Lebanon” (Salloukh 2013). These confrontations, political struggles, and political competitions in the region have led to several proxy wars and armed confrontations between ethnic parties in Lebanon.

Instability in Lebanon not only includes security issues, but also political system instability. There have been a numbers of political assassinations during the period of 1989 to 2015. Ethnic groups and political parties engage not only in cold war, and direct confrontation and conflict, but also in political assassinations between one another (Salloukh 2013).

The Lebanese consociational political system creates a sectarian formula that strengthens extreme sectarian political elites. The Taif agreement was based on a consociational democratic system and power sharing, dividing pieces of the political “pie” between the three dominant ethnicities. The agreement largely followed a “sectarian formula,” which allocated the presidency to the Maronite Christians, the speaker of the house to the Shiites minority, and the premiership to the Sunnis minority (Makdisi and Marktanner 2008, 10, 11). According to Salamey (2009, 83):

All public offices are corporate according to confessional and sectarian affiliations. They assigned confessions on the proportional principle of 5 Muslims to every 6 appointed Christians. Along the same confessional office-allocation principle, all elected seats of the National Assembly are divided. Cabinet ministers and ministry general-directors as well as heads of the Armed Forces, the Central Bank, and the National University, among other sensitive public positions, are distributed along sectarian lines to accommodate the delicate confessional balance.

Yet, the Taif agreement did not enhance normal stability and democratic principles in Lebanon, and the nation “suffered from a number of shortcomings related to sectarianism, external interventions and discriminatory practices among others” (Makdisi and Marktanner 2008, 10-11). According to the Polity IV dataset, despite the signing of the agreement 26 years ago, Lebanon has still not converted to a full democracy. The sectarian balance in Lebanon that was established by consociational democracy led to a weak state, which failed in its ability to implement effective policies. It also led to instability and encouraged regional states that have ethnic links and political interest to easily intervene in Lebanese internal and external affairs (Makdisi and Marktanner 2008, 11). After every election in Lebanon, the Lebanese political elitists fail to form a government without neighboring states agreement. Recently, in September

2015, Indo Asian News Service indicated that the Lebanese failed to elect a new president for the ninth time, and:

Lebanon has been without a president since May 25, 2014 when the six-year term of former president Michel Suleiman ended. Ongoing disputes between the rival March 8 and [March] 14 camps over a compromise presidential candidate have thwarted the polls. The western backed March 14 camp backs the election of the Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, while the March 8 camp led by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militant party backs the election of head of the Change and Reform parliamentary bloc MP Michel Aoun. The centrist Democratic Gathering led by MP Walid Jumblatt announced the candidacy of its member Henri Helou. None of the rival camps have the majority to elect the president that should be according to the national pact a Christian Maronite (Indo Asian News Service 2015).

Kyrgyzstan

Unlike Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan has experienced a different type of political system, despite its similarly ethnic-divided society and cross regional ethnic minority links. After gaining its independence from the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan developed a normal majoritarian political system despite its divisions. The first period of Kyrgyzstan's political life from 1991 to 2005 was considered an authoritarian system. However, in the second period from 2005 to 2010, Kyrgyzstan developed a form of majoritarian democracy. While it was not a fully democratic system at this time, there were levels of political participation appropriate for a majoritarian democratic system. Since 2010, Kyrgyzstan has adopted a new constitution that redistributed power and extended participation to ethnic minorities. In addition, the new constitution guarantees ethnic minorities' rights upon the majoritarian political democratic system, which has led to democratic development and enhances stability and security. Kyrgyzstan's society is divided along linguistic and ethnic identities, where the population is 65% Kyrgyz, 14% Uzbeks, 14% Russian, and 7% Tajiks and other small ethnic minorities. After declaring independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan experienced two revolutions and political system changes in 2005 and 2010. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan experienced continued degrees of instability from 1991 to 2011. However, the instability in Kyrgyzstan was due to democratic development and corruption of political elites and political leaders. The instability was also due to fragmentation between different ethnic minorities because of the absence of a comprehensive political system that provided equal

opportunities for all ethnic minorities to participate in political life. Yet, since 2011, Kyrgyzstan has experienced remarkable democratic development, stability, and security (Ryskulov 2010). As a fragmented society, Kyrgyzstan is divided by a geographic and ethnic division between North and South. The first president of Kyrgyzstan was from the majority Kyrgyz north region, while the second president was from the minority Uzbek south region (Matveeva, 2011). From 1991 to 2005, Kyrgyzstan was not fully stable country, Because of the political struggle between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and because Kyrgyz attempted to impose their power at the expense of Uzbeks, tensions and ethnic conflict took place several times between the two dominant groups. Despite the conflict, the people of Kyrgyzstan did not call for a consociational democratic system, but rather, in 2005, the different ethnic minorities revolted against the dictator and called for a democratic majoritarian system that provided equal opportunity for all people.

The first president of Kyrgyzstan, Akave, was able to successfully govern Kyrgyzstan until 2005. Yet, the Akeave period was considered as a period of corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. According to Melvin (2011) “Akaev’s policy of appointing political protégés and rotating them through the key post of governor of Osh Oblast caused widespread resentment in southern Kyrgyzstan. Southerners were quick to point out that the Osh region’s leaders during the Akaev years hailed from the northern part of the country. This grievance provided a powerful means to promote political mobilization in the south but grievances were not enough—political organization was also required.”(Melvin 2011, 14). Akaeve was able to restore the order and partial stability in Kyrgyzstan. However, he was not able to face the nepotism and cronyism and increase the usurpation of power. This situation, led to the emergence of more fragmentation in Kyrgyzstan between different ethnic minorities, which led to a revolution in 2005. After the 2005 revolution, Bakiev took over the presidency, but his period was not much different from the Akave period in terms of corruption. Bakiev tried to legitimize his power through falsifications of the presidential election in 2009 and the parliamentary election in 2007. During the Bakiev period, the tension and confrontation between ethnic minorities increased. In 2006, ethnic conformation in the Dungan Village led to the destruction of homes and a number of injured people. “The lack of adequate and responsible policy led to decrease of standard of living, increase of corruption level, increase the level of regionalism, cronyism and nepotism, and decrease the fulfillment of basic rights and freedoms. Manifestation of all these fatal mistakes brought the country to economic

recession” (Ryskulov, 2010, 104). This situation escalated the violence between ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan. Nichol (2013, 6) states that: Deep-seated tensions between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan erupted on June 10-13, 2010. Grievances included perceptions among some ethnic Kyrgyz in the south that ethnic Uzbeks controlled commerce, views of some ethnic Uzbeks that they were excluded from the political process, and views among many Bakiyev supporters in the south that ethnic Uzbeks were supporting their opponents. Allegedly, fighting began between rival ethnic-based gangs at a casino in the city of Osh on the night of June 10-11 and quickly escalated, fuelled by rumors of rapes and other atrocities committed by each side. The fighting over the next few days resulted in at least 470 deaths and nearly 2,000 injuries. About three-quarters of those killed reportedly were ethnic Uzbeks, while injuries were more evenly distributed between the two ethnic groups. The violence also resulted in a wave of over 400,000 refugees and IDPs, mostly ethnic Uzbeks, and the destruction of nearly 3,000 homes and businesses in Osh and Jalal-Abad, mostly those belonging to ethnic Uzbeks.

This situation quickly led to the second revolution in 2010, where political opposition mobilized people to change the political system in Kyrgyzstan. During the revolution, many people were killed and many others were injured. The revolution led to the collapse of the central government and continued ethnic violence. Uzbek leaders, and leaders from ethnic minorities felt that the time had come to call for a new constitution and including minority rights. “The main focus of their efforts were negotiations to ensure that there [will be] ... new constitution [that] reflected the rights and aspirations of Uzbeks, including in the areas of language, education, and representation (Melivin 2011, 16). The new constitution was designed to be a hybrid majoritarian political system, which guaranteed equal opportunity rights to ethnic minorities. It distributed power between the president, prime minister, and legislature. In October 2010, the political parties held their first competitive free election and started their new political democratic life. In December 2010, the first free democratic government was approved by 92 votes out of 120 sets. By October 2011, the first competitive presidential election was held, and “the Central Electoral Commission ... approved 23 candidates.” In November 2011, the Central Electoral Commission announced that Atambayev won the presidential election with 62% of the votes (Nichol 2013, 9).

Despite the divided society in Kyrgyzstan, and connections to ethnic minorities in surrounding states, Kyrgyzstan has not faced neighboring states intervention even through several ethnic conflicts between different minorities. Kyrgyzstan has a close relationship with its neighbors, such as Russian. Yet, Russia expressed no desire to send troops to Kyrgyzstan when ethnic violence took place against Russians minorities. Some scholars believe that Russia's reluctance to send troops was due to the concern that sending them may lead to a need to intervene later at a much larger scale, thus endangering the stability of the political system in Russia itself. In addition, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan also expressed no desire to intervene in the situation even though these states also have links with ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan (Troitskiy 2012). Based on evidence from this case study, I argue that a majoritarian political system closes the channels for neighboring states to intervene in a nation's internal affairs. Although there may be desire from neighboring states to intervene and empower the minorities they are linked to, the political system is based in a majority rule, and the intervention from neighboring states would be difficult and ineffective. Furthermore, less neighboring states intervening has reduced the level of instability, political straggles, confrontation, and conflict between ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the instability in Kyrgyzstan from 1991 to 2010 is due to corruption, nepotism, and the lack of democracy and participation for most of people from different minorities. Unlike Lebanon, the instability in the region did not affect the stability in Kyrgyzstan even though ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan have links with ethnic minorities in neighboring states.

Conclusion

Lijphart's idea of a consociational democratic system as a political system that ensures power sharing, equal ethnic participation, ethnic cooperation, and reduction in the confrontations and conflict between ethnic minorities does not always work. In the case of Lebanon, the consociational political institution led to a sectarian political system. The actual design of Lebanese political system was to prevent sectarianism and increase nationalism, reduce violence between ethnic minorities, and ensure security and stability. However, the opposite outcomes occurred in Lebanon. By examining the history of the situation in Lebanon from 1989 to 2015, it is clear that a consociational democratic system can lead to instability and insecurity and reinforce a sectarian system. The internal armed confrontations between different ethnic minorities, intrastate dispute, and tensions between sects regarding political issues and power sharing along with strong links with other ethnic minorities and states in the region weakened the state of

Lebanon. In addition, the consociational democratic system created channels for regional power states with ethnic links and political interests to intervene in Lebanese internal affairs. Such a political system motivated foreign interventions in Lebanon in domestic issues and directed foreign policy not in favor of the Lebanese.

Unlike Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan's adoption of a majoritarian political system generated different outcomes. Instability in Kyrgyzstan from 1991 to 2010 was due to government corruption, nepotism, and the lack of democracy and participation. Even though Kyrgyzstan faced some instability during this period, the degree of instability was less than that of Lebanon. Furthermore, the reasons behind instability in Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon were different, as were their strategies for dealing with the instability. This study argues that consociational political systems suffer from a lack of mechanisms for conflict management among ethnic minorities. In fact, I argue that consociational democratic systems actually increase the levels of instability, confrontation, tension, conflict, and political struggles between ethnic minorities. In addition, unlike Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan also did not face neighboring states intervention. Thus, this study argues that majoritarian political systems close the channels for external intervention even when the state's ethnic minorities have links with other ethnic minorities in neighboring states. Since all ethnic minorities have equal rights of participation but no veto rights that might strengthen their position at the expense of others, external intervention will have no effect. This study argues that the majoritarian political system led to stability and democratic development in Kyrgyzstan as well as prevented neighboring states intervention. On the other hand, this study argues that the consociational democratic system in Lebanon facilitated external intervention from neighboring states and hindered stability and democratic development. Finally, new consociational democratic systems do encourage external intervention, also new consociational democratic systems increases the levels of intervention. This study aimed to examine the effect of new consociational democratic system on stability and external intervention from neighboring qualitatively due to the lack of data on consociational democratic systems. Given the lack of data, further research should be conducted to examine our hypotheses. In addition, quantitative data on this topic should be collected so that future quantitative research can provide insight into conflict management in various political systems.

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